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To quantify head-up tralzsition behavior with and without a jlightpatlz type head-up display, ekht  rated 
B-727 pilots each jlew 31 nzanual and coupled approaches in a sitnulator with B-727 dynanzics and collinzated 
~pzodel board external scene. Data were also obtained on the roll played by the head-up display in the coupled- 
to-inanual transitio~z. Various wind shears, low visibilities, and ceilings were tested along with unexpected nzis- 
alignnzent between the runway and head-up display symbology. The symbolic fomzat used was a confomzal 
jlightpath type optically stiperimposed over the external scene. f i e  following results are reported. ( I )  Every 
pilot except one stayed head-up, jlying with the display after descending below the ceiling. Without tlze display 
and as altitude decreased, the nunzber of lookups from the instrument panel decreased and the duration of each 
one increased. (2)  No large differences in mean nzirnber or duration o f  transitions up or down were found 
during the head-up display runs comparing tlze 110-nzisalignnzent with the lateral instrument landing system 
offset misalignment runs. (3) The head-up display led to fewer transitioizs after the pilot rnade a decision to 
land or execute a missed approach. (4) Without the display, pilots generally waited until they had descended 
below the ceiling to look outside the first time, but with it several pilots looked down at their panel at relatively 
high altitudes (if they looked dowrz at all). (5) Manual takeover of control was rapid and snzooth both with and 
without the display. The display pe~mitted smoother engine power changes, that is, fewer chatzges of usually 
smaller magnitude after autopilot disconnect. Vertical rate and control colunzn displacement data before and 
after disconnect showed no significant differences. (6)  A posttest debriefing indicated overall acceptance o f  the 
format used and overall test realism. 
The head-up display (HUD) is a radical departure 
from the traditional philosophy of cockpit design for 
flight instruments. Its chief characteristic is the 
entirely different position chosen for presenting flight 
guidance and control information - superimposed 
over the pilot's forward line of sight through the air- 
craft's windshield. This is achieved by locating above 
the glare shield a semitransparent reflecting glass 
upon which various symbols are reflected toward the 
pilot's eyes. The HUD optical imaging system also 
presents the symbology at optical infinity so that it 
appears at the same distance as the runway. Because 
of these two HUD characteristics the number of tran- 
sitions from head-down to head-up and vice versa and 
shifts in visual acconlmodation (theoretically) should 
be minimized. 
Another important characteristic of HUD is its 
capacity for displaying a wide range of information 
through the use of microprocessor-controlled elec- 
tronic display techniques. This may make it possible 
to more fully match the displayed information to the 
pilot's perceptual and cognitive capabilities. Never- 
theless, with or without HUD, a transition from 
instruments to outside visual cues must be made dur- 
ing every approach to landing; however, it has been 
claimed that a HUD will ease this transition (ref. 1). 
Both in-flight and simulator research on the issue 
of pilot head-up transition time has been reviewed in 
a previous paper (ref. 2). If a HUD is used during tlze 
approach and landing the pilot already will be 
head-up and looking out of the window at breakout. 
Of course this will depend, among other things, on 
the particular cockpit procedures used. The HUD 
might tend to ease the transition to external visual 
cues because the pilot is facilitated in attending to 
both the HUD information (which is predominately 
aircraft related) and the external scene information at 
the same time (refs. 3-5). That is, a well-designed 
HUD might allow t l ~ e  pilot to attend continuously to 
fields of information that can only be viewed dis- 
joilltedly in the conventional cockpit (ref. 6). If this 
is tlue, the HUD should be useful in situations in 
which both the external world and the instrument 
information are needed at the same time; for exam- 
ple, in a missed approach, when the decision to go 
around has been left to the last moment at which the 
external world can still safely be scanned. Time is of 
the essence in reverting to instrument guidance 
(ref. 7). Therefore, for a pilot flying with a HUD, 
transition probably becomes a matter of continuously 
processing information along the flightpath from the 
two superin~posed sets of infornlation. 
In aircraft without HUD the physical movement of 
the pilot's head and eyes, the refocus of his lens from 
near to far distance, and the cognitive processes 
involved in switching from one "frame of reference" 
to  another take a finite amount of time as the pilot 
looks up from the instrument panel to the outside 
scene. In aircraft with HUD the pilot need not look 
back at the instrument panel if the display and exter- 
nal scene together present him with necessary and 
sufficient flight information. Relatively little work 
has been done to quantify these basic pilot behaviors; 
this is the prinlary objective of the present study, 
which was one of three coincident studies. The others 
were concerned with cognitive switching between the 
HUD and external scene when a mismatch between 
the two existed (ref. 8) and eye-scan behavior during 
the approach and landing.' 
T l ~ e  head-up transition involves two separate corn- 
ponents: (I)  a plzj)sical one, involving movement of 
the head (and shifted line of sight) and a change in 
the accommodative state of the eye's focus distance, 
and (2) a cognitive or attentional component. Few 
investigators have attempted to  separate these two 
basic types of behavior, perhaps because of the 
practical and theoretical difficulties in doing so. 
In the following brief review previous research is 
described in terms of using a HUD during the transi- 
'Pilot Eye Moverilents During Simulated Low Visibility 
Approaches, Proposed NASA Technical Paper by T. A. Price, 
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tion from instrument meteorological condition (IMC) 
to visual meteorological condition (VMC) flight. 
Transition Time with HUC 
Several laboratory, simulator, and in-flight investi- 
gations have addressed the subject of transition iirne 
with HUD. Early simulator studies showed that pilots 
responded more rapidly to stimuli in the external 
world while performing a tracking task in the head-up 
mode than when tracking head-down (ref. 9). In 
addition, flight tests with HUD in which pilots known 
to be using HUD were given incorrect (fly-down) 
guidance when flying close to the ground during 
terrain-following showed that they survived the 
experience (presumably) because they were able to 
reject the incorrect commands. Apparently, the pilots 
were able to divide their attention successfully 
between the two separate sources of information. The 
pilots also perceived other air traffic and birds more 
effectively when flying with HUD. 
A laboratory study found that the critical assess- 
ment of the presence of certain flight-related infor- 
mation in either or both information fields took a 
negligible amount of time (of the order of 25 msec 
for the external scene and 100 msec for HUD using a 
series of HUD symbol formats superimposed over 
external scenes (ref. 10)). The procedure used was 
that of presenting (briefly) the HUD symbology 
alone, the background scene alone, or the two super- 
inlposed and asking the pilot to answer questions that 
could only be answered correctly if the requested 
information was present and perceived. When the 
pilot was already "head-up," search and recognition 
time took place within a very brief period of time 
compared with typical visual fixation durations of 
from 0.4 to 1.9 sec (refs. 11-13). 
No previous research could be found for the 
head-up transition time (fro111 the instrument panel) 
or visual cue assessment and decisionnlaking time of 
pilots using a HUD and external visual cues. Refer- 
ence 10 does provide infonnation on previous 
research with HUD related to cognitive switching 
between HUD and an external scene. Suffice it to say 
that the transition time one is dealing with when a 
HUD is used after breakout is priinarily that of an 
ongoing perceptual processing of both sets of infor- 
mation. 
Transition Time Without HUD 
Transition time witliout HUD has been ~ev~ewed 
elsewlie~e (ref. 2); the following comments ale 111u- 
ited to those plevious f~ndings that ale ]elated to the 
present study. The mean decision time required to  
assess the outside scene and thenfdecide to execute a 
missed approach or continue to a landing was 2 to 
4.6 sec for ceilings under 380 ft during manual instru- 
ment landing system (ILS) approaches. The 
approaches were flown in a simulator at approxi- 
mately 126 knots; a variety of low-visibility and wind 
conditions were present (ref. 2). The required deci- 
sion time is in agreement with findings of previous 
research (ref. 14). It was also found that the mean 
vertical distance traveled during this visual cue assess- 
ment period was a relatively constant proportion of 
the existing ceiling height. The mean number of 
head-up transitions after breakout ranged from 4.6 to 
13.4 and increased in frequency as a function of ceil- 
ing height. The practical significance of this lies in the 
fact that each head-up transition requires a finite 
amount of time which, when summed, can account 
for an appreciable proportion of the total available 
viewing time. For example, for an aircraft flying at 
135 knots on a 3" flightpath the transit time between 
each 100 ft of altitude is only 8.4 sec. If the aircraft 
is at 100 ft altitude and the pilot makes as few as four 
separate head-up/head-down transitions, each of 
which takes 1.5 sec, a total of 6 sec will have elapsed; 
moreover, some part of the total of 6 sec provides 
little useful guidance and control information, due to 
such factors as the blurred retinal images produced by 
itoring the head-up and head-down behavior of the 
pilot continuously in a variety of flight conditions 
where the quantity and quality of external cues was 
varied, and (2) determining the point on the approach 
where the pilot indicated that he had sufficient visual 
information to continue the approach to a landing or 
t o  execute a missed approach. Each of these methods 
was done with and without the aid of HUD. Flight 
performance data also were collected during the tran- 
sition from coupled to manual flight with and with- 
out HUD during a limited number of approaches by  
each pilot. 
This study was conducted as part of the joint 
FAA/NASA Head-Up Display Concept Evaluation 
Project, Task Order DOT-FAA77WAI-725 t o  Inter- 
agency Agreement NASA-NMI 1052.1 5 1 ,  dated 
March 9, 1977. The present investigation constituted 
a subtask of Phase 2 work on perceptual and human 
factors related to the HUD concept. 
We wish to  thank Capt. C. F. (Dick) Pocius, Alan 
Simpson, Edward Leitner, and Donna Miller for their 
able assistance in the conduct of this study and to 
personnel of the Ames Simulation Sciences Division, 
Electronic Instrument Services Branch, and Flight 
Systems Research Division for their part in hardware 
and software development. 
METHOD 
the eye scans and changes in accommodation. Test Subject Pilots 
The large number of physical and cognitive 
response factors and their inherent complexity makes Eight rated B-727 pilots were tested. A number of 
separation and quantification difficult. In the present descriptive characteristics for each pilot are given in 
investigatiort the methods used were those of (I)  mon- table 1. All pilots were obtained through a NASA 
TABLE 1 .- SUBJECT PILOT INFORMATION 
Pilot 
Capt. 
Capt . 
FO 
FO 
Seat Cat. I1 
rated/ 
aircraft 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
I Estimated number of I Aircraft 
type 
Hours 
in type b 
' ~ e a n  = 44.1. 
' ~ e a n  = 1,827 hr. 
'pilot unable to provide an estimate, but responded "Lots." 
20 1 
10 
c 
6,000 
1,550 
2,400 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
contractor and all were paid for their services. Two 
pilots (B and E) had previous HUD silnulator 
experience. 
Experi~nentai Design and Test Variables 
This experiment was designed to  permit valid com- 
parisons to be made between the HUD and no-HUD 
runs across all other variables. These test variables 
included the following: the seven environmental con- 
ditions listed in table 2; five cognitive parameters 
described below and elsewhere in detail (ref. 8); and 
three control modes described below. 
Since it was not possible to test all permutations 
of the above variables, a subset of 31 was tested. Each 
combination of three variables is listed in appendix A; 
they are defined in the following text. 
Referring to table 2, it may be noted that the com- 
bination of breakout ceilings and runway visual 
ranges (RVR's) coupled with the decision height 
(DH) required the pilot to make a rapid assessment of 
the external scene before reaching decision height. 
For environn~ental condition (I), for instance, there 
was a 20-ft height difference between the ceiling and 
DH. At a 3" glide slope (GS) and nominal 135-knot 
approach speed the aircraft would travel this segment 
in only 1.8 sec. Colnparable travel times for environ- 
mental conditions (4), (5), and (6) would be 3.8 sec, 
1.6 sec, and 6.8 sec, respectively. For purposes of 
comparison, environments (2) through (5) were the 
same as those used in a previous head-up transition 
study (ref. 2). Finally, the variable runway visual 
range (RVR) condition of environment (6) was such 
that the runway environment became visible at an 
altitude between 700 and 550 ft. Thereafter a simu- 
lated scud layer totally and realistically obsc~tred the 
ground between 550 and 275 ft, which then "opened 
up" to permit sight of the approach lights (RVR 
equivalent to about 2,400 ft) down to  an altitude of 
80 ft, followed by a final RVR of 1,000 ft. This 
changing visibility of the ground pernlitted the pilot 
flying with HUD to transition froill HUD information 
only in IMC flight to  HUD plus ground scene in 
(clear) VMC flight. 
Referring to the wind shear column in table 2,  
no. 9 consisted of a 15-knot tower-reported head- 
wind. From the 1,500-ft initial altitude to 150 ft 
there was a 30-knot headwind which sheared to 
18 knots at 50-ft altitude followed by an exponential 
decay to 15 knots at the runway. Shear no. 25 con- 
sisted of calm wind reported at the tower. From the 
1,500-ft initial altitude to the ground, the initial 
25-knot headwind decreased exponentially to zero at 
the ground. 
Five cognitive parameters were included in the 
study; they are described in table 3 and elsewhere 
(ref. 8). These parameters were included to  meet the 
objectives of another phase of the study (ref. 8); 
nevertheless, head-up transition data was collected in 
cognitive parameters 2-4 described below. 
Three control mode variables were also investi- 
gated in addition to  the above described variables. 
'31 test runs per pilot - 18 with HUD, 13 without 
b ~ u n w a y  visual range. 
'~ecision height. 
TABLE 2 .- ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 
Environmental conditions 
No. 
1 
Test runsa 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Number 
8,000 
8,000 
2,400 
1,600 
Variable 
2,000 
RVR! ft 
1,600 
HUD 
4 
% 
380 No. 9 Moderate 
170 No.25 Light 
700 None Light 
180 None Light 100 
Ceiling, ft 
-- 
120 
Shear 
None 
NoHUD 
2 
HUD 
13 
NoHUD 
6 
Turbulence 
Light 
DH: ft 
100 
TABLE 3 .- COGNlTIVE PARAMETERS 
Cognitive 
parameter 
a ~ h e  first number within each bracket is the 
number of approaches made by each pilot for the 
given cognitive parameter; the second is that num- 
ber expressed as a percentage of the total number 
of approaches (3 1). 
~ e s c r i ~ t i o n ~  
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
They were: (1) marzual flight, in which the approach 
and landing (or missed approach) were made without 
autopilot or autothrottle; (2) coupledfliglzt, in which 
the approach was controlled by an autopilot (without 
autothrottle) to flare altitude, after which the pilot 
uncoupled and executed the flare (or missed 
approach) manually; and (3) zltzexpected autopilot 
disconnect, in which the approach was controlled by 
the autopilot (without autothrottle) to an altitude 
about 10 f t  above DH, at which time a red flashing 
glare-shield-mounted "disconnect" light came on. The 
pilot was instructed to continue the approach man- 
ually in this situation. The computer produced this 
Runway incursion - Go around man- 
datory. Model of jet aircraft to 
same scale as the Redifon runway 
environment was placed on 
approach end of runway at  45" 
angle to centerline and halfway 
onto runway from taxiway 
[2; 6%]. 
Vertical misalignment of HUD - A 
simulated boresight misalignment 
of 2O produced by elevating entire 
HUD symbology relative to real 
runway [3 ; lo%] . 
Lateral misalignment of HUD - A 
simulated 3" boresight misalign- 
ment of the HUD to both the left- 
and right-hand sides relative to  
real runway [2; 6%] . 
Lateral simulated ILS HUD misalign- 
ment - Entire set of aircraft coor- 
dinates shifted 90 (scale) ft to left 
and right of real runway to  simu- 
late ILS lateral error [6; 20%] . 
No-mismatch - All of the conformal 
HUD symbols correctly overlay 
the proper points (and areas) on 
the background scene [18; 60961. 
disconnect at randomly determined heights from 5 to 
12 ft above DH. For these trials the pilot was told 
(before starting the trial) only that it was t o  be a 
coupled approach. During training the pilots were 
told that if there should be an unexpected disconnect 
they should be prepared to take over manually. 
Twenty-five (81%) of the total 31 approaches made 
by each pilot were manual, 4 (13%) were unexpected 
autopilot disconnects, and 2 (6%) were coupled and 
flown to flare height, after which the pilot discon- 
nected the autopilot and landed. 
The final variable was whether or not a HUD was 
used. Eighteen (58%) of the 31 total approaches were 
flown with HUD and 13 (42%) without HUD in a 
random presentation order. 
Head-Up Display 
The head-up display was produced by a PDP 11/40 
computer driving an Evans and Sutherland Picture 
System; it was displayed on a monitor in front of the 
simulator's left seat. The pilot viewed this symbology 
by reflection off a partially reflective mirror; the 
external (Redifon) scene also was viewed through this 
mirror such that both were correctly superimposed. 
Both sets of information (HUD and external scene) 
were collimated to apparent optical infinity by means 
of two acrylic, 61 -cm (24-in.) focal length, 63.5-cm 
(25-in.) diameter lenses producing a 46" wide virtual 
image at the reference eye position (ref. 15). 
The HUD symbology (described in detail in 
ref 16), consisted of an integrated array of flight 
guidance and control symbols (see fig. 1) presented 
within a field of view 24" wide by 21" high. Briefly, 
the horizon (labeled with heading numerals and ticks) 
was pitch and roll stabilized and moved in a 1 : 1 fash- 
ion with the horizon of the external scene. An 
unlabeled So pitch-up and a labeled 10" pitch-down 
and pitch-up line (all parallel to the horizon) were 
present. Only the 5" pitch-up line can be seen in 
figure 1. An aircraft reference (extension of the longi- 
tudinal body axis) was represented by the small "v" 
with horizontal wings; it is seen just above the 
090 heading numeral in figure 2. This symbol, a flash- 
ing letter indicating transit over a marker beacon, and 
a distance measuring equipment (DME) readout 
(directly above this symbol), were the only symbols 
that did not move within the HUD's field of view. 
The small circle with bent wings represented the 
instantaneous flightpath. Digital airspeed in knots was 
located just to the left of the wingtip of this symbol 
Figure 1 .- Head-up display symbology. 
and digital altitude in feet just to the right. These two 
digits stayed in the same position relative to the 
flightpath symbol to  assist the pilot in quickly locat- 
ing them. Speed error was indicated by a vertical tape 
rising out of the top of the flightpath symbol's left 
wing for positive speed error and descending from the 
bottom of the wing for negative speed error (relative 
to VREF which the pilot manually set). A horizontal 
pointer, which traveled normal to the flightpath sym- 
bol's wings, indicated the acceleration along the 
flightpath at any instant. Known as the potential 
flightpath, this symbol provided a means for adjusting 
the power so as to maintain a desired acceleration for 
any given flightpath. A three-sided artificial runway 
outline symbol appeared inside the outer marker 
remaining conformal with the external runway (for 
the no-mismatch conditions). In addition, ILS local- 
izes and glide-slope symbols were present. The glide- 
slope symbol consisted of a small circle with seg- 
mented horizontal lines at the same vertical position 
in the field of view as the circle; the circle was free to  
move vertically. The localizer symbol was a seg- 
mented vertical line with lateral freedom of motion. 
If the flightpath symbol was flown such that the 
glide-slope circle was inside it and the localizer lines 
bisected both circles, the aircraft would be in the cor- 
rect location for continuing the approach to land. 
Procedures 
The procedures used may be described in three 
sections: pretest, data collection, and post test. A 
written description with diagrams of the HUD sym- 
bology was mailed to each pilot several weeks prior to 
his arrival at Anles Research Center. On the first test 
day, the pilots were given a battery of vision tests and 
a FIUD questionnaire to complete. Then they were 
shown a video tape, which presented the HUD as it 
Figure 2.- Cockpit interior. 
would appear to them against cloud and ground back- intercom controls. Figure 2 shows a view of the cock- 
grounds in a variety of approach and landing Inaneu- pit with these controls. At least six no-HUD farniliar- 
vers. This 24-rnin-long tape began by discussing each ization trials were then given; turbulence, crosswinds, 
symbol as an individual information ele~nent and then moderate wind shear, and lower visibilities were intro- 
in combination with other symbols, progressively duced only in the later runs. When the pilot said he 
including de~nonstrations of some effects on symbol was familiar with the simulator environment and with 
motion of turbulence and shear and the appearance the aircraft's flying qualities, the HUD symbology 
of runway environment details under varying visibili- was introduced. Following are the basic HUD training 
ties. Reduced visibilities were produced electron- and familiarization trial conditions given to every 
ically, using the technique of white raster line overlay pilot. In several instances pilots asked to repeat a 
to reduce contrast. The pilots were encouraged to ask condition or two, presumably in an effort to improve 
questions about the HUD at any time they felt some- his performance. All trials began at an altitude of 
thing was unclear. 1,500 ft and at a distance of 9.5 miles from the run- 
The following pilot training regimen was used. way, with the aircraft trimmed either for level flight 
Each pilot was taken to the simtllator and shown all (LF) or for a 3" glide slope (GS). 
of the controls, IlUD syn~bology controls, eye- The training conditions with HUD were as follows: 
reference positioning device, seat adjustments, auto- 1. RVR 50,000 ft; ceiling 700 ft ;  no turbulence, 
pilot disconnect and other response buttons, and (LF). 
2. Same as above. (The first two trials were pri- 
marily for symbol identification and demonstration 
of their motions.) 
3.  RVR 10,000 ft; ceiling 700 ft; n o  turbulence, 
(LF). 
4. Same as above. (Trials 3 and 4 were to  result in 
a landing. The flare symbol, DME, and marker beacon 
annunciation were pointed out and further familiar- 
ization with the flightpath and potential flightpath 
symbol was achieved.) 
5. RVR 2,400 ft; ceiling 500 ft; light turbulence, 
(GS). (In this and the two preceding trails the glide- 
slope intercept procedures were demonstrated. This 
trial resulted in a landing.) 
6. RVR 2,400 ft ;  ceiling 250 ft; moderate turbu- 
lence, 10-knot crosswind from the right, (GS). (The 
checklist used in the study was introduced and a land- 
ing was made.) 
7. RVR 1,600 ft; ceiling 300 ft ;  moderate turbu- 
lence, (GS). (A deliberate missed approach was exe- 
cuted at about 50  ft .  The runway clearance-weather 
briefing was given along with the use of the check- 
list .) 
8. RVR 1,600 ft ;  ceiling 175 ft ;  no  turbulence, 
moderate head-wind shear of 25 knots decaying to 
0 knots at the runway, (GS). (All of the required 
cockpit procedures, call-outs, etc, were used.) 
9. RVR 1,600 ft; ceiling 175 ft ;  moderate turbu- 
lence, (GS). (This trial provided further opportunity 
to clarify all of the testing requirements and call-outs 
desired by the pilot flying of the first officer who was 
an experimenter; RFH). 
Use of the autopilot disconnect yoke button was 
demonstrated during at least two of these nine train- 
ing runs. If a pilot requested to repeat one or more of 
these conditions it was done immediately after the 
trial. Training in control of the flightpath symbol was 
done using both the glide-slope and localizer refer- 
ence symbols as the null or aiming point as well as 
having the pilot attempt to place the flightpath sym- 
bol directly on the runway touchdown zone. Training 
in control of the potential flightpath symbol con- 
sisted of asking the pilot to try to maintain a given 
airspeed at each of several different flightpath angles, 
to try to establish a specific flightpath angle for a 
fixed throttle setting, and to control both flightpath 
and throttle in the presence of a head-wind shear. By 
the end of training these pilots were proficient with 
these operations and indicated that they understood 
the meaning and use of each syn~bol. 
Procedures used during the data collection portion 
of the study included a 'kadio" call by the first offi- 
cer to an experimenter for the weather (RVR, ceiling, 
winds) for that approach and a clearance to land. In 
most instances, this information was completed 
before the outer marker was reached. The captain 
called for the checklist, which was read by  the first 
officer (who also operated the gear and flap controls). 
An experimenter stood behind the pilot ready to 
press a button (B) (see fig. 2) when the pilot said the 
word "decision." He was instructed to say "decision" 
when he was head-up and had enough visual informa- 
tion t o  decide whether he would continue the 
approach to a landing or would execute a missed 
approach. No special prompting was given concerning 
whether the decision was to  be made as early or as 
late as possible. The pilot was supposed to  scan the 
available external information - including HUD 
information for the HUD runs - in a manner typical 
of that which he would use during an actual 
approach. The experimenter also informed the pilot 
whether the approach was to  be manual or coupled. 
For the manual-approach runs the pilot was simply 
to  disconnect the autopilot and continue the 
approach manually. He was never told whether there 
would be an unexpected disconnect. 
For the no-HUD runs the decision time was mea- 
sured from the moment the pilot first looked up from 
the instrument panel (IP) to the moment he said 
"decision." For the HUD runs the decision time was 
measured from the moment the first officer indicated 
the runway was in sight to  the moment the pilot said 
"decision." The two decision times cannot be com- 
pared directly; still, they are useful in setting approxi- 
mate transition time limits on this response. 
Figure 2 shows a HUD control panel (CP) located 
on the left end of the glare shield. Two press-and- 
turn-to-set control knobs were used by the pilot, after 
he started the trial, to set in the DH altitude and the 
VREF for landing. Pressing in on each knob caused 
the current digital value to  disappear; rotating each 
knob caused the desired number to  appear on the 
HUD; letting go of each knob locked the desired 
number in and caused the current value to reappear. 
The DH value set in was made to flash at 3 Hz from 
100 ft above its preset value to touchdown. As the 
VREF knob was depressed and turned to the 
desired value the airspeed error "vertical tape" lose 
out of the top of the left "wing" of the flightpath 
synlbol by a (scaled) amount propoitional to the cur- 
rent difference between airspeed and VREF (see 
fig. 1). To increase workload by requiring the pilot to 
set VREF on every approach, the first officer called 
out a predetermined value that was to be set into the 
HUD. This was done during the checklist reading or, 
more often, just after the trial started. 
The pilot's eye movements were nlonitored unob- 
trusively by means of an infrared oculometer 
(ref. 17), the projection and photocell reception head 
of which are shown at (0) in figure 2. The results of 
this part of the study are being prepared for a later 
report. A video tape, made on every approach, 
included the same color external view as was seen by 
the pilots, the superi~nposed MUD, eye movement 
"dot," and a black-and-white view of the pilot's head 
and eyes, which was inset into one corner of the 
screen. The TV lens used to obtain this view is labeled 
(L) in figure 2. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results are presented in four sections: 
(1) mean duration and number of separate transitions 
made with and without HUD; (2) mean altitude at 
which the first transition was made with and without 
HUD; (3) responses made to unexpected autopilot 
disconnect with and without HUD; and (4) subjective 
opinion results. 
Mean Duration and Number of Transitions 
A transition is defined as a change in the pilot's 
line of sight between the instrument panel and for- 
ward view. The fundamental distinction was which 
source of information was used rather than the direc- 
tion of the pilot's line of sight at any instant. These 
mean transition data were analyzed separately for 
each of four flight segments for the no-mismatch and 
the mismatch runs. The first segment was from the 
glide-slope intercept to the ceiling and involved IMC 
flight in all cases. Because of the test instructions, the 
pilot should have stayed head-down during all of the 
no-HUD runs (since there was nothing visible outside 
for the first officer to see or call out). It can be men- 
tioned that, in fact, all eight pilots stayed head-down 
during this segment except one: he looked outside 
several times during a run with a reported RVR of 
greater than 8,000 ft and a ceiling of 650 ft and 
looked out once during a run with a reported RVR of 
greater than 8,000 ft and a ceiling of 380 ft. The 
secotid flight segment was from the ceiling to decision 
height (DH), the third from decision height to 50 ft, 
and the fourth from 50 ft to the ground. 
No-inis~~zatclz ineati results- Mean data for runs in 
which there was no mismatch between the HUD and 
external scene are presented in appendixes B 
through H and in figures 3 through 5.  The (typical) 
altitude range traversed and the theoretical transit 
time assuming a 3O glide slope and 135-knot approach 
speed are also given in brackets for each flight seg- 
ment to allow comparisons to be made with the mean 
transition duration and other data. For the no-HUD 
data, these pilots made increasingly longer looks (up) 
outside the cockpit as altitude decreased and also 
made increasingly shorter looks (down) to  the IP as 
altitude decreased, which is expected during normal 
information cross-check procedures. It can also be 
noted that fewer transitions tended to  be made as 
altitude decreased, a finding in agreement with 
previous research (refs. 2, 17). Because of the small 
sample size and missing data it was not possible to  
carry out an analysis of variance on the data of 
appendixes B through H. Product-moment correla- 
tions were run on these mean data with the following 
results. The midrange altitude for each flight segment 
in each section of appendixes B through H was 
determined and then rank ordered; this became 
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Figure 3.- Mean number of transitions up from 
instrument panel as a function of ceiling height: 
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Figure 4.- Mean duration of transitions up from Figure 5.- Mean duration of transitions down from 
instrument panel as a function of ceiling height: the external scene after first having looked up 
flying without HUD. from instrument panel as a function of ceiling 
height: flying without HUD. 
variable X in the correlation calculation. The mean 
number of looks (up) from the IP during the no-HUD 
runs corresponding to each ranked altitude was 
variable Y. A significant (JJ < 0.005) positive correla- 
tion of r = 0.73 was found, i.e., the lower the altitude 
the s~naller the number of looks (up) after the pilots 
had once looked up from the IP. The second correla- 
tion tested was between the rank-ordered mean 
altitudes (as above) and mean duration of each 
transition up from the IP during the no-HUD runs. 
This correlation of r = -0.4 was not significant. The 
third correlation was between mean head-up transi- 
tion duration and the mean number of looks (up) 
from the IP. The r = 0.1 value was not significant, a 
result that is probably due to the confounding effect 
of combining these mean data from six environments, 
each of which possessed different visibilities. 
What is also of interest is the transition behavior of 
these pilots when they were using HUD. These mean 
data are also presented in appendixes B through H. 
For these no-mismatch conditions, every pilot stayed 
head-up, after descending below the ceiling for five of 
the six environmental conditions tested which 
involved homogeneous fog (i.e., environments (1)-(4) 
and (7)). Thus, these pilots never once looked at the 
IP after the ground had come into sight. Only one 
exception to this occurred involving one pilot (see 
appendix F for the 170-ft ceiling to 150-ft decision 
height segment). These findings are variously inter- 
preted. 
It niay be that these pilots judged that HUD pro- 
vided fully adequate flight guidance and control 
inforination for these test conditions. In other words, 
these pilots may have placed a high degree of reliance 
on the HUD even though they had never flown this 
type of display before. Perhaps such a finding is, at 
least partially, due to  the fact that the pilots knew 
they were in a simulator; as a result, that could have 
led them to  disregard the usual consequences of a 
crash or otherwise poorly executed approach and 
landing. These pilots indicated (during the post test 
comment period) that they did not feel a need to 
request additional call-outs by the first officer over 
those they normally used (without HUD). Still 
another possibility is that these pilots did not seri- 
ously consider the possibility that they would be 
allowed to  fly a HUD that was somehow in error. 
Evidence to  support this possibility is presented in a 
companion paper (ref. 8). This last interpretation 
raises the question of transition behavior during runs 
in which a deliberate mismatch was introduced in 
the HUD information, a subject considered in a later 
section of this paper. 
Comparison of no-mismatch mean decision time 
and transition results with those fionz a previous 
study- In order to allow direct con~parison of these 
results to  be made with a previous head-up transition 
study (without HUD) (ref. 2), five of the present 
environmental conditions were the same as those used 
previously. The same basic instructions and method 
were also used in both studies. The mean number of 
transitions up from the IP averaged across all four 
flight segments for the present study and mean deci- 
sion time (sec) from both studies are presented in 
table 4. 
TABLE 4.- COMPARISON OF PRESENT NO-HUD MANUAL 
CONTROL RESULTS WITH PREVIOUS HEAD-UP 
TRANSITION STUDY 
I Environment I Present study I Previous study (ref. 2) 1 
I 
conditions 
3 
RVR 8,000 ft 
- 
X no. of 
- 
X decision 
Ceiling 615 ft 
2 
RVR 8,000 ft 
Ceiling 380 ft 
time, seca 
17.9 
4 
RVR 2,400 ft 
Ceiling 245 ft 
1 RVR 1,600 1 ft 2 . 3  2 . 3  2 . 2  4 . 6  1 
- 
X no. of 
5.2 
5 
RVR 1,600 ft 
Ceiling as noted 
- 
X decision 
transitions 
13.5 
4.3 
'~ecision time was measured from the moment the pilot looked 
up from the IP to the moment he said the word "decision." 
b ~ l l  pilots stayed head-up during the 50-ft-to-touchdown 
segment. 
'~11 pilots stayed head-up during the glide-slope-intercept-to- 
ceiling segment. 
7.7b 
6.6 1 4.8' 
Ceiling = 170 ft 
Ceiling as noted 
time, seca 
7.3 
5 -4' 
2.0 1 5.5 
Ceiling = 180 ft 
transitions 
13.4 
4.6 
Ceiling = 120 ft 
10.8 
3.5 
Ceiling = 130 ft 
7.3 
Relatively similar results were found between the 
two studies. Neither the mean decision times nor the 
mean number of transitions were statistically signifi- 
cantly different between the two studies, using the 
p < 0.05 level of confidence criterion and the ran- 
domization test for two independent samples 
(ref. 18). 
Generally, the lower the RVR and ceiling the 
fewer the number of transitions and the shorter the 
decision times. Although the mean nunlber of transi- 
tions up from the instrument panel tended to be 
greater for each environmental condition in-the pre- 
vious study, all of the mean decision times were 
shorter. This may be due to  the fact that a motion- 
base simulator was used in the previous study which 
could have led the pilot t o  perceive more instability 
in the external scene (perhaps due to  head motion) 
than was present in the same scene presented in this 
study: such perceived instability may have led the 
pilot to make more head-up transitions to obtain the 
required information within the available time. 
In summary, the present no-mismatch mean data 
indicate that, without HUD, pilots tend to make 
fewer transitions but make increasingly longer futa- 
tions outside the cockpit as altitude decreases. 
HUD mismatch mean results- The only mismatch 
condition in which a direct comparison can be made 
between the HUD and the no-HUD runs is the lateral 
ILS mismatch condition (cognitive parameter 4). 
Appendixes I through K present the mean number of 
transitions and mean duration of these data. Three 
environmental conditions (1, 2 ,  and 3) were used to  
compare performance with this type of visual mis- 
match situation. 
In interpreting these data it should be pointed out 
that the Sperry flight director (model HZdB "Hori- 
zon Flight Director Indicator") used during the 
no-HUD runs presented angular-pitch-change informa- 
tion in reduced scale, presumably making these dis- 
placements more difficult to detect visually, even if 
the pilot were checking the flight director after look- 
ing up. It also might be presumed that if the pilot had 
an indication of an ILS deviation during the no-HUD 
runs, he would make more head-up and head-down 
cross-checks after breakout to  try to resolve the 
incongruity. No clear-cut trends of this nature were 
found. There was some evidence to indicate that few 
of these pilots detected this mismatch without HUD; 
every pilot detected the mismatch with HUD, how- 
ever. These results are presented in reference 8. 
Pilot transition data also were obtained during the 
two other mismatch conditions that involved vertical 
and lateral boresight misalignment. Since there was 
no instrument panel condition that was equivalent 
to the head-up display misalignment, they were only 
tested in the HUD runs. As was the case with the 
lateral ILS mismatch condition discussed above, both 
of these misalignment conditions became apparent to  
the pilot after the runway environment came into 
sight. It was anticipated that pilots would tend to 
make more or longer head-down transitions to the 
instrument panel. This did not occur, except in the 
case of one pilot during the ceiling-to-DH segment 
and the DH to  50-ft segment in environment (3). For 
environment (3) this pilot looked down from the 
HUD once for 0.6 sec during the higher flight seg- 
ment and once for 1 sec during the lower flight seg- 
ment. For environment (2) (i.e., RVR > 8,000 ft ,  
380-ft ceiling, more severe headwind shear, moderate 
turbulence, and 200-ft DH) one pilot looked down 
from the HUD once for less than 1 sec for the lateral 
boresight runs and stayed head-up for the vertical 
boresight runs during all flight segments. Finally, for 
environment (1) (i.e., RVR 1,600 ft, 120-ft ceiling, 
no wind shear, light turbulence, and 100-ft DH) one 
pilot looked down from the HUD once for less than 
1 sec for the vertical boresight run during the decision 
height to 50-ft flight segment. Otherwise, he stayed 
head-up for all of the other runs. 
In summary it appears reasonable to say that these 
two unexpected HUD mismatch conditions did not 
lead these pilots to transition down from the HUD 
for any cross-check information, except in the 
extremely small number of instances cited above. 
This finding might be explained in a way that is some- 
what different from that in which the lateral ILS off- 
set data were explained, namely, that these pilots 
may have detected the offset at some point in the 
approach, but relied on the appearance of the back- 
ground scene to bring about an adequate resolution, 
that is, an acceptable landing maneuver. 
Conzpa~ison of nzisnlatclz and no-mismatclz lnearz 
results avitlzout HUD- A comparison was also made 
between the mean decision time and number of tran- 
sitions for the no-HUD runs in which there was lateral 
ILS ~nismatch on the flight director versus those in 
which there was not. No clear-cut differences were 
found, and, for all but 3 of the 36 con~parisons, mean 
decision time was within 1.3 sec for the two condi- 
tions (typically of the order of 0.3 sec). The remain- 
ing three conlparisons gave mean-decision-time 
differences of 2.4 sec (no-mismatch longer); 5.3 sec 
(mismatch longer); and 19.4 sec (mismatch longer). 
The 19.4-sec value was probably due to  the fact that 
the pilot was attending t o  the external scene at a 
relatively high altitude (615 ft) during a greater 
proportion of the available viewing time compared 
with the lower ceiling and RVR conditions in which 
he would be expected to refer to  the flight director 
on the instrument panel more of the time. 
Number 0.f tralzsitio~zs following the pilot's 
decision- A third response measure, which is of inter- 
est from the point of view of informational adequacy 
during the final stages of an approach with and with- 
out HUD, is the number of transitions made after the 
pilot indicated (verbally) that he had sufficient visual 
information t o  continue the approach to a landing or 
to execute a missed approach. If when flying head-up 
without the HUD he looks down at his IP after his 
decision it implies that he feels the need to  update 
the information that (previously) led to his decision; 
if when flying head-up with the HUD he looks down 
at his IP after his decision is made it may imply the 
same thing, it may imply that he perceives a mis- 
match or other information discrepancy that can be 
resolved by looking down at the IP, or i t  could mean 
that he still does not fully understand the HUD infor- 
mation. Such transitions following a pilot's decision 
while flying HUD might provide a measure of the ade- 
quacy of the HUD symbology for leading the pilot to 
make the correct decision. Table 5 presents these data 
for the no-mismatch runs. For example, the upper 
left-hand data cell shows that seven pilots made no 
transitions while one made two transitions using the 
HUD. 
It can be seen that the HUD runs lead to a larger 
proportion of pilots making fewer transitions down 
to the instrument panel and that the no-HUD runs 
lead to their making a relatively large number of 
transitions down once they had looked up in order to 
make their decision. The data of table 5 have been 
arranged from the top down in terms of increasingly 
lower minima and visibility. Interestingly, even the 
relatively low ceilings lead to a number of head-down 
transitions without HUD after the pilot's decision has 
been made. It might be argued, of course, that the 
pilots made their decisions relatively early after 
assessing the ground cues, which would permit them 
to continue to make subsequent transitions to 
"update" the adequacy of their decision. 
Mean Altitude at First Transition 
Another basic response measure of interest is the 
altitude at which each pilot made his first transition 
down to the IP when flying with HUD or up to the 
external scene when flying without HUD. individual 
pilot data are plotted in figure 6 in no particular 
order for each environmental condition and for the 
HUD and no-HUD runs. The dashed horizontal line 
indicates the ceiling. 
Most of the pilots did not look up from the IP 
until after descending below the ceiling, as was 
required by the test instructions, while flying without 
HUD. The data are arranged without regard to which 
data point refers to  which pilot so as to illustrate the 
manner in which these altitudes are distributed. For 
the two highest ceilings (615 and 380 ft), both with 
RVR > 8,000 ft, the pilots flying without HUD 
looked up the first time over a wider range of alti- 
tudes (173 and 192 ft, respectively), having once 
descended below the ceiling, than they did for the 
lower ceilings and RVR conditions. Typically only 
three or four of the eight pilots ever looked down at 
all, depending on the en'vironmental condition. 
Although all of the above data are for the manual 
runs, no substantial differences were noted in the alti- 
tude at which each pilot first transitioned up or down 
in the coupled runs. 
In summary it may be said that only about one- 
half of the present pilots flying with HUD ever cross- 
checked against the instrument panel. When they did 
so it was in IMC flight. Although this finding may be 
interpreted as pointing to the adequacy of the HUD 
information, it might also be seen as a reason to take 
a careful look at the procedures that are implemented 
for use with future HUDs. It is still problematical 
whether the call-outs and other cross-checks made by 
the pilot not flying (without a HUD in a single HUD 
installation) will adequately fill the information gaps 
that may be left by this seeming dependency upon 
HUD information alone. 
Control Responses Made to Unexpected 
Autopilot Disconnects 
Pilot control performance with and without HUD 
following an unexpected autopilot disconnect was 
analyzed for each of the two environmental condi- 
tions in which this situation occurred (i.e., environ- 
ments (5) and (6)). The instantaneous vertical rate 
before and at the moment of disconnect (DISC) and 
each 2.5 sec thereafter to a maximum of 10 sec was 
quantified to see whether the HUD information 
would influence the smoothness of the manual 
takeover. The results showed that there were no large 
'n.d. = no decision. 
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Figure 6.- Mean altitude at which each pilot made an initial transition with and without HUD for each environ- 
mental condition - continued. 
or statistically significant differences in this per- 
formance measure. The same can be said of the 
control column displacement. A comparison of each 
pilot's control of engine rprn (%) generally showed 
fewer and lower magnitude power setting changes 
with HUD following disconnect, as illustrated in 
figure 7. A disconnect (DISC) line and touchdown 
(TD) arrow are also shown. Percent power is shown 
on the abscissa and 5-sec tick marks on the ordinate. 
This finding is probably the result of having the 
potential flightpath symbol available within the 
central eye-scan area on the HUD. 
In summary, it nlay be said that these pilots took 
over manual control sn~oothly following an unex- 
pected autopilot disconnect both with and without 
the HUD. Use of the HUD seemed to assist them in 
making desired engine power settings after the 
disconnect. 
HUD 
CEILING = 170 ft CEILING = 120 ft El 
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Figure 6.- Mean altitude at which each pilot made an initial transition with and without HUD for each environ- 
mental condition - concluded. 
Subjective Opinion Results 
Following each test run the pilots were asked to  
comment on a number of issues related to the ade- 
quacy of the experimental simulation, the infosma- 
tion provided by the HUD and instrument panel, and 
other matters. 
/ 
The following questions were asked: 
1.  Was there anything about the cockpit environ- 
ment that served to distract you from obtaining all 
the infol-mation needed to land? 
2. List here anything about this simulation whch  
you feel was so unrealistic as to invalidate your data. 
3 .  Was anything unclear to  you during this study? 
If so what? 
4. Once you were familiar with the HUD did it 
ever lead you to seriously consider descending below 
minimums? , 
5. Were you at any time transfixed or overly con- 
centrating upon any particular HUD symbol? If "yes" 
specify which one. 
6. Which of the following pairs of test conditions 
was most difficult for you? 
PILOT PILOT HUD 
HUD NO HUD NO HUD 
DISC. 
T D  
/TICK MARKS 
/ARE 5 sec 
APART 
TD 
DISC. 
(a) ENGINE POWER SETTING, % (b) ENGINE POWER SETTING, % 
Figure 7.- Engine power setting before and after unexpected autopilot disconnect flying with and without HUD: 
environment (5). 
7. Considering only the wind-shear conditions pre- 10. Only considering those approaches on which 
sented, which HUD symbols seemed to be most use- there was a ~nismatch between the real runway and 
ful t o  you? (Rank order from most to  least useful.) the HUD runway outline, how do you feel your flight 
8. Considering only the low RVR conditions pre- control performance was affected? 
sented, which HUD symbols seemed to be most use- 11. How would a well-designed HUD affect flight ful t o  you? (Rank order from most to  least useful.) 
safety in your opinion? 9. Comparing the HUD with the no-HUD runs, do 
you think you made (select answer from list) head-up The responses of each pilot are presented in 
transitions using the HUD? table 6. All responses are direct quotes. 

TA
BL
E 
6.-
 
CO
N
TI
N
U
ED
 
6.
 C
on
cl
ud
ed
 
(A
) H
U
D
 +
 u
n
ex
pe
ct
ed
 
au
to
pi
lo
t D
IS
C 
(B
) 
n
o
-H
U
D
 +
 u
n
ex
pe
ct
ed
 
au
to
pi
lo
t D
IS
C 
7.
 M
os
t u
se
fu
l H
U
D
 in
fo
rm
a-
 
tio
n 
fo
r c
o
pi
ng
 w
ith
 w
in
d 
sh
ea
r?
 (r
an
ke
d) 
8.
 M
os
t u
se
fu
l H
U
D
 in
fo
rm
a-
 
tio
n 
fo
r c
o
pi
ng
 w
ith
 lo
w
 
RV
R?
 (r
an
ke
d) 
9.
 H
ea
d-
up
 tr
an
si
tio
ns
 m
ad
e 
w
ith
 a
n
d 
w
ith
ou
t H
U
D
 
(A
) A
pp
ro
xi
m
at
el
y 
sa
m
e 
n
u
m
be
r 
(B
) 
So
m
ew
ha
t m
o
re
 w
ith
 
(C
) 
Cr
ea
t m
a
n
y 
m
o
re
 w
ith
 
(D
) S
om
ew
ha
t l
es
s w
ith
 
I 
(E
) 
G
re
at
 m
an
y 
le
ss
 
1 
(F
) 
Ca
n't
 s
ay
 
) 
(G
) 
O
th
er
 a
n
sw
er
 
N 
0
 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
A
irs
pe
ed
, 
po
te
nt
ia
l 
fli
gh
tp
at
h 
A
irs
pe
ed
, 
po
te
nt
ia
l 
fli
gh
tp
at
h 
G 
N
ev
er
 w
en
t 
he
ad
-d
ow
n 
w
ith
 H
U
D
 
C B 
Fl
ig
ht
pa
th
, 
po
te
nt
ia
l 
fli
gh
tp
at
h,
 
ai
rs
pe
ed
 
er
ro
r,
 
al
tit
ud
e 
di
gi
t, 
D
M
E 
Sa
m
e 
as
 fo
r 
qu
es
tio
n 
(7)
 
E 
-
 
E B 
Po
te
nt
ia
l 
fli
gh
tp
at
h,
 
ai
rs
pe
ed
 
er
ro
r,
 G
.S
. 
ci
rc
le
 
I 
G.
S.
 c
irc
le
, 
al
tit
ud
e 
di
gi
t, 
ai
rs
pe
ed
 
er
ro
r 
E 
Pi
lo
t 
D B
 
Po
te
nt
ia
l 
fli
gh
tp
at
h,
 
ai
rs
pe
ed
 
di
gi
t, 
fli
gh
tp
at
h 
Sa
m
e 
as
 fo
r 
qu
es
tio
n 
(7)
 
E 
H 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
I 
A
irs
pe
ed
 
I P
ot
en
tia
l 
er
ro
r,
 
fli
gh
tp
at
h,
 
po
te
nt
ia
l 
ai
rs
pe
ed
 
fli
gh
tp
at
h,
 
' 
er
ro
r,
 
ai
rs
pe
ed
 
' a
irs
pe
ed
 
di
gi
t 
I digi
t 
I 
Po
te
nt
ia
l 
fli
gh
tp
at
h,
 
ai
rs
pe
ed
 
er
ro
r,
 
ai
rs
pe
ed
 
di
gi
t 
1 
Sa
m
e a
s 
fo
r 
1 Fl
ig
ht
pa
th
, 
] Sa
m
e a
s 
fa
 
qu
es
tio
n 
(7)
 
al
tit
ud
e 
di
gi
t 
(fo
r f
la
re
), 
ai
rs
pe
ed
 d
ig
it 
I 
E 
' 
E 
I I 
E 
A
bb
re
vi
at
ed
 
qu
es
tio
n 
10
. F
lig
ht
 c
o
n
tr
ol
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
w
ith
 H
U
D
 d
ur
in
g 
m
ism
at
ch
 
ru
n
s 
o
n
ly
 
(A
) V
er
y 
n
eg
lig
ib
ly
 a
ff
ec
te
d 
(B)
 S
om
ew
ha
t n
eg
lig
ib
ly
 
af
fe
ct
ed
 
(C
) 
N
ot
 a
ff
ec
te
d 
-
 
an
n
o
yi
ng
 
(D
) N
ot
 a
ffe
ct
ed
 in
 a
n
y 
w
ay
 
I I
. 
H
ow
 w
o
u
ld
 a
 w
el
l-d
es
ig
ne
d 
H
U
D
 a
ffe
ct
 f
ig
ht
 sa
fe
ty
? 
(A
) S
ig
ni
fic
an
tly
 d
eg
ra
de
 
(B
) 
Po
ss
ib
ly
 d
eg
ra
de
 
(C
) 
N
o 
pa
rti
cu
la
r 
in
flu
en
ce
 
(D
) P
os
sib
ly
 im
pr
ov
e 
(E
) 
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 im
pr
ov
e 
TA
BL
E 
6.-
 
CO
N
CL
U
D
ED
 
L
 
Pi
lo
t 
Each pilot was allowed to  comment on anything 
pertaining to  this debriefing questionnaire - several 
comments are noteworthy. Regarding question (S), 
most of the pilots said that their excessive concentra- 
tion on HUD symbols occurred principally during the 
earlier runs before they had become familiar with par- 
ticular symbols. One pilot commented that such over- 
concentration "could happen with a head-down flight 
director." Another said that he felt his visual "cross- 
check wasn't that good on the HUD because it is a 
new display." Several pilots commented on the seem- 
ingly long time needed to  manually set in the HUD 
VREF and DH values. Regarding question (lo), 
pilot A said he was never aware of a mismatch when 
flying without HUD. Pilot C stated that he felt he 
could handle the offsets better with a HUD; however, 
he did not think that the mismatches he encountered 
in this study were deliberate. Pilots D and E also 
stated that they felt a misalignment between the air- 
craft and real world was coped with better with a 
HUD because, as one of the pilots put it, ". . . with a 
HUD, I can see what's happening earlier." 
Following are comments given freely in regard t o  
question (1 1). 
Pilot A: "A beautiful system. Cross-check is easier, 
everything is there, (it) makes your eye-scan easier." 
Pilot B: "I'm very impressed with it . . . this is a 
mechanical gadget which can fly better than the pilot 
can under many circumstances." 
Pilot C: "It's like looking directly at the ground, a 
continuation of the outside world. All (the) informa- 
tion needed is right there." 
Pilot D: "From what I know now about HUD and 
particularly flare . . . a well-designed HUD would sig- 
nificantly improve flight safety." 
Pilot G: "After a few flights and flight (tests) 
proven by others and a few flights (in an aircraft) by 
myself . . . a well-designed HUD would significantly 
improve flight safety ." 
To summarize this section, the post test questions 
that dealt with the simulation and experiment itself 
seemed to point to the general acceptance by these 
pilots of the overall realism of the cockpit. No pilot 
felt his data should be eliminated from the analysis 
on the basis of nonrealistic testing conditions. The 
questions that dealt with HUD versus no-HUD perfor- 
mance showed that these pilots felt that manual 
approaches and unexpected autopilot disconnect situ- 
ations were easier to cope with when HUD was used. 
There was less consistency of opinion concerning 
whether HUD helped the pilot monitor the coupled 
approach (to the point of flare). Regarding ques- 
tion (9), it should be noted that most of these pilots 
were very conservative in their answer that use of 
HUD led to a great many less head-up transitions. 
Comparison of the number of transitions with and 
without HUD (table 5) illustrates this fact; indeed, 
almost every pilot stayed head-up when flying the 
HUD below the breakout ceiling. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The primary objective of this study was to quan- 
tify the head-up transition behavior of pilots in simu- 
lated low-visibility conditions with and without HUD. 
It was found that when flying without HUD, pilots 
generally made increasingly longer looks outside the 
cockpit as altitude - thus distance to the touchdown 
point - decreased. This was true for both the 
no-mismatch and the mismatch conditions. The pilots 
also made fewer transitions outside as altitude 
decreased. With one exception, these pilots, when fly- 
ing with HUD, did not look down at the instrument 
panel after the ground came into sight for either the 
no-mismatch or the mismatch condition. These find- 
ings are interpreted to mean that the pilots were satis- 
fied with their control performance with HUD and 
did not feel they needed supplementary panel infor- 
mation. This interpretation is supported by the fact 
that these pilots did not request additional call-outs 
by the first officer other than those used for the 
no-HUD runs. For the ILS-offset runs, the pilots sel- 
dom noticed the offset displayed on the attitude 
director indicator (ADI) whereas they perceived it 
relatively quickly after breakout with the HUD. 
A decision to land or to go around is very likely 
made on a continuous basis during the approach. This 
is suggested in the present study by the relatively 
large number of head-down transitions t o  the instru- 
ment panel made after the pilot made his decision. 
Since the no-HUD runs led to a larger proportion of 
pilots making a larger number of such transitions than 
on the HUD runs, it would appear that HUD does 
contribute to reducing the pilot's visual scanning 
tasks, an important component of his workload. 
Although these simulator performance data may 
be representative of the transition behavior likely t o  
be found in flight, there are reasons they should not 
be accepted uncritically. For example: (1) the possi- 
bility that these pilots were not as experienced in the 
task of evaluating two superin~posed sets of visual 
information simultaneously as they might have been; 
(2) they were not as familiar with the simulator 
environ~nent as they are with their own aircraft, 
and/or (3) some feature of the simulator's external 
visual scene (e.g., reduced resolution compared with 
the real world) may make these data different from 
those found in flight. The relatively good agreement 
between the mean transition data from this and a pre- 
vious simulator study does lend confidence in the 
reliability of these data. Further simulator research is 
called for to quantify pilot eye-scan and fixation 
behavior along with transition behavior during low- 
visibility approaches with and without HUD. Such 
data would help us understand better the quantitative 
and qualitativc dimensions of the visual cues pilots 
use to land their aircraft. 
Ames Research Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Moffett Field, California 94035, July 28,1980 
APPEIiDIX A 
TEST VARIABLES ADMINISTERED 
APPENDIX B 
TRANSITIONS: NO MISMATCI-I, ENVIRONMENT 3 
Mean number N, SD, and duration of transitions (sec) for no-mismatch, manual approaches only. 
Environment 3: RVR > 8,000 ft, shear 25, ceiling 615 ft, moderate turbulence. 
TABLE B 1 .- TRANSITIONS UP FROM IP 
TABLE B2.- TRANSITIONS DOWN FROM EXTERNAL SCENE AFTER FIRST HEAD-UP TRANSITION 
a ~ l t i t u d e  and duration values given for each flight segment are based on an assumed airspeed of 
135 !mots and a 3" glide slope. 
b ~ l l  pilots stayed head-up. 
'N too small to calculate a valid SD. 
APPENDIX C 
TRASIJSITIONS: NO MISMATCH, ENVIRONMENT 2 
Mean number N, SD, and duration of transitions (sec) for no-mismatch, manual approaches only. 
Environment 2: RVR > 8,000 ft ,  shear 9, ceiling 380 ft, moderate turbulence. 
TABLE C 1 .- TRANSITIONS UP FROM IP 
a ~ l t i t u d e  and duration values given for each flight segment are based on an assumed airspeed of 
135 knots and a 3" glide slope. 
b ~ l l  pilots stayed head-up. 
"N too small to calculate a valid SD. 
TABLE C2.- TRANSITIONS DOWN FROM EXTERNAL SCENE AFTER FIRST HEAD-UP TRANSITION 
Flight 
segment 
a 
GS intercept to 
ceiling 
380-ft ceiling 
to  DH 
(180 ft = 15 sec) 
200-ft decision 
height to 50 ft 
(150 ft = 12.6 sec) 
50  ft t o  glound 
(50 ft = 4.2 sec) 
Number of pilots 
HUD 
3 
SD 
NoHUD 
1 
HUD 
0.83 
b 
b 
b 8 
NoHUD 
c 
37.1 
2.3 
b 
- 
X, sec N 
HUD 
2.5 
' b 
b 
b 
HUD 
3.3 
b 
b 
b 
NoHUD 
200 
6.4 
2.2 
b 
NoHUD 
1 
4 
3.4 
b 
APPENDIX D 
TRANSITIONS: NO MISMATCH, ENVIRONMENT 4 
Mean number N, SD, and duration of transitions (see) for no-mismatch, manual approaches only. 
Environment 4: RVR 2,400 ft, shear 9, ceiling 245 ft, moderate turbulence. 
TABLE Dl  .- TRANSITIONS UP FROM IP 
- 
TABLE D2.- TRANSITIONS DOWN FROM EXTERNAL SCENE AFTER FIRST HEAD-UP TRANSITION 
'Altitude and duration values given for each flight segment are based on an assumed airspeed of 
135 knots and a 3' glide slope. 
b ~ l l  pilots stayed head-down. 
" ~ l l  pilots stayed head-up. 
APPENDIX E 
TRANSITIONS: NO MISMATCH, ENVIRONMENT 7 
Mean number N, SD, and duration of transitions (sec) for no-mismatch, manual approaches only 
Environment 7 : RVR 2,000 ft , no shear, ceiling 180 ft , light turbulence. 
TABLE E l  .- TRANSITIONS W FROM Il? 
a ~ l t i t u d e  and duration values given for each flight segment are based on an assumed airspeed of 
135 knots and a 3" glide slope. 
bAll pilots stayed head-down. 
'N too small to calculate a valid SD. 
d ~ l l  piIots stayed head-up. 
e ~ h i s  environn~ent was used for the runway incursion run. None of the pilots descended below 
50 ft because they executed a n~issed approach prior to reaching this segment, as described else- 
where (ref. 8). 
TABLE E2.- TRANSITIONS DOWN FROM EXTERNAL SCENE AFTER FIRST HEAD-UP 
TRANSITION 
Number of pilots Flight 
segment 
u 
GS inte~cept 
to ceiling 
180-ft ceiling 
to DH 
(80 ft = 6.7 sec) 
100-ft decision 
height to 50  ft 
(50 ft = 4.2 sec) 
50 ft to grounde 
(50 ft = 4.2 sec) 
HUD 
2 
8 
8 
8 
SD 
Number of pilots 
NoHUD 
8 
3 
2 
8 
HUD 
c 
d 
d 
d 
N 
Flight 
segment 
u 
GS intercept 
to  ceiling 
180-ft ceiling 
to  DH 
(80 ft = 6.7 sec) 
, 100-ft decision 
height to 50 ft 
(50 ft - 4.2 sec) 
50  ft to grouilde 
(50 ft = 4.2 sec) 
L 
HUD 
3 
8 
8 
8 
SD 
NoHUD 
b 
c 
c 
d 
HUD 
1 
cl 
d 
d 
R, sec 
NoHUD 
8 
2 
3 
8 
HUD 
49.3 
d 
d 
d 
N 
NoHUD 
b 
1.3 
1 .5 
cl 
HUD 
39 
d 
tl 
d 
NoHUD 
b 
c 
8 .O 
d 
HUD 
1 
d 
cl 
d 
- 
X, sec 
NoHUD 
b 
1.3 
2.9 
d 
NoHUD 
b 
1 
1.7 
d 
HUD 
35.3 
d 
d 
d 
No HUD 
b 
3.4 
5.4 
d 
APPENDIX F 
TRrnSITIONS: NO MISMATCH, ENVIRONMENT 5 
Mean number N, SD, and duration of transitions (sec) for no-mismatch, manual approaches only. 
Environment 5 : RVR 1,600 ft, shear 25, ceiling 170 ft, light turbulence. 
TABLE F1.- TUNSITIONS UP FROM IP 
TABLE F2.- TRANSITIONS DOWN FROM EXTERNAL SCENE AFTER FIRST HEAD-UP 
TRANSITION 
APPENDIX 6 
TRANSITIONS: NO MISMATCH, ENVIRONMENT 1 
Mean number N, SD, and duration of transitions (sec) for no-mismatch, manual approaches. 
Environment 1: RVR 1,600 ft, no shear, ceiling 120 ft, light turbulence. 
TABLE G2.- TRANSITIONS DOWN FROM EXTERNAL SCENE AFTER FIRST HEAD-UP 
TRANSITION 
- I Flight I X, iec I N / SD I Number o t p l l o f r l  
'~ l t i tude  and duration values for each flight segment are based on an assumed airspeed of 
135 knots and a 3" glide slope. 
b ~ l l  pilots stayed head-down. 
' ~ 1 1  pilots stayed head-up. 
%I too small to calculate a valid SD. 
e~ l though  each of two pilots made one transition down, neither transitioned back up in this flight 
segment. 
APPENDIX N 
TRANSITIONS: NO MISMATCH, ENVIRONMENT 6 
Mean number N, SD, and duration of transitions (sec) for no mismatch, under manual control. 
Environment 6: RVR variable, no shear, ceiling variable, light turbulence. 
TABLE H2.- TRANSITIONS DOWN FROM EXTERNAL SCENE AFTER FIRST HEAD-W 
TRANSITION 
a ~ l t i t u d e  and duration values given for each flight segment are based on an assumed airspeed of 
135 knots and a 3" glide slope. 
b.a_ll pilots stayed head-up. 
APPENDIX I 
TRRNSITIONS: LATERAL ILS MISMATCH, ENVIRONMENT 3 
Mean number N, SD, and duration of transitions (sec) for lateral ILS mismatch under manual control. 
Environment 3: RVR > 8,000 ft, shear 25,  ceiling 615 ft, moderate turbulence. 
TABLE 11. - TMNSITIONS W FROM IP 
Flight 
segment 
a 
GS intercept 
to  ceiling 
61 5-ft ceiling 
(415 ft = 35 sec) 
200-ft decision 
height to 50 ft 1 t:t=12.6sec)l 1 
50 ft t o  ground 0 
(50 ft = 4.2 sec) 
- 
X, sec 
HUD 
28.6 
TABLE 12.- TRANSITIONS DOWN FROM EXTERNAL SCENE AFTER FIRST 
HEAD-UP TRANSITION 
N 
NoHUD 
b 
HUD 
2 
c 
c 
c 
1.6 
1.8 
NoHUD 
b 
6.8 
3.1 
0 
SD Number of pilots 
HUD 
d 
c 
c 
c 
HUD 
1 
8 
8 
8 
NoHUD 
b 
1.2 
1.1 
--- 
No HUD 
8 
8 
8 
8 
APPENDIX J 
TRANSITIONS: LATERAL ILS MISMATCH, ENVIRONMENT 2 
Mean number N, SD, and duration of transitions (sec) for lateral ILS mismatch under manual control. 
Environment 2: RVR > 8,000 ft, shear 9, ceiling 380 ft, moderate turbulence. 
TABLE J1.- TRANSITIONS UP FROM IP 
Flight 
segment 
l a 
I 
GS intercept 
to  ceiling 
380-ft ceiling 
to  DH 
(1 80 ft = 15 sec) 
200-ft decision 
height to 50 ft 
(150 ft = 12.6 sec) 
50 ft to ground 
(50 ft = 4.2 sec) 
TABLE 52.- TRANSITIONS DOWN FROM EXTERNAL SCENE AFTER FIRST HEAD-UP 
TRANSITION 
a ~ l t i t u d e  and duration values given for each flight segment are based on an assumed airspeed of 
135 knots and a 3" glide slope. 
b ~ l l  pilots stayed head-up. 
'N too small to calculate a valid SD. 
APPENDIX K 
TRANSITIONS: LATERAL ILS MISMATCH, ENVIRONMENT 1 
Mean number N, SD, and duration of transitions (sec) for lateral ILS mismatch under manual control. 
Environment 1: RVR 1,600 ft, no shear, ceiling 120 ft, light turbulence. 
TABLE K1.- TRANSITIONS UP FROM I? 
TABLE K2.- TRANSITIONS DOWN FROM EXTERNAL SCENE AFTER FIRST HEAD-UP 
TRANSITION 
I .  Jenney, L. L.; Malone, T. B.; and Schweickert, 
G. A., Jr.: Head-Up Displays: A Study of 
Their Applicability in Civil Aviation. Matrix 
Research Division, URS Systems Corp., 
Falls Church, Va., Jan. 8 ,  1971. NASA 
CR-117135. 
2. Haines, R. F.: Head-Up Transition Behavior of 
Pilots During Simulated Low Visibility 
Approaches. NASA TP-1618, June 1980. 
3. Naish, J .  M.: Combination of Information in 
Superimposed Visual Fields. Nature, vol. 202, 
May 16,1964, pp. 641-646. 
4 .  Naish, J. M.: Display Research and Its Applica- 
tion to  Civil Aircraft. J. Roy. Aeronaut. Soc., 
vol. 69, no. 658, Oct. 1965, p. 665. 
5. Naish, J. M.: Factors Affecting Head-Up Display 
Design. 8th Annual IEEE Symposium, Hurnan 
Factors in Electronics, Palo Alto, Calif., May 
1967. 
6. Ellis, W. H. B.; and Allan, R. N.: Pilot's Eye 
Movements During Visual Approaches and 
Landings. Air Ministry, F.P.R.C., (United 
Kingdom), Report. No. 888, 1954. 
7. Beck, R. H.: The Hostile Environment of Low 
Visibility. Paper presented at 15th Airline 
Pilots Association, Air Safety Forum, Seattle, 
Wash., July 9-11, 1968. 
8. Fischer, E.; Haines, R. F.; and Price, T.: Selected 
Cognitive Issues with HUD. NASA TP-1711, 
1980. 
9. Naish, J .  M.; and Shiel, R.: Flight Trials of the 
Head-Up Display (H.U.D.) in Meteor 718 and 
Hunter 12 Aircraft. R.A.E. Farnborough 
(United Kingdom), TR 65254, Nov. 1965, 
pp. 37 ,49,50.  
10. Fischer, E.: The Role of Cognitive Switching in 
Head-Up Displays. NASA CR-3 137,1979. 
11. Weir, D. H.; and Klein, R. H.: Measurement and 
Analysis of Pilot Scanning Behavior During 
Simulated Instrument Approaches. AIAA 
Paper 70-999, Santa Barbara, Calif., 1970. 
12. Fitts, P. M.; Jones, R. E.; and Milton, J. L.: Eye 
Movements of Aircraft Pilots During 
Instrument-Landing Approaches. Human Fac- 
tors Engineering - Concepts and Theory, 
D. M. Fitts, ed., University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1962, pp. 35.1.1- 
35.1.6. 
13. Watts, A. F. A.; and Wiltshire, H. C.: Investiga- 
tion of Eye Movements of an Aircraft Pilot 
under Blind Approach Conditions. Note 
No. 26, The College of Aeronautics, Cranfield, 
England, May 1955. 
14. Brown, A. D.: Category I1 - A Simulation Study 
of Approaches and Landings at Night. Royal 
Aircraft Establishment, Technical Memo 
Avionics 59 (BLEU), England, 1970. 
15. Gander, B. C.: Virtual Image Display for Flight 
Simulation. NASA TM X-2327, 1971. 
16. Bray, R. S.: A Head-Up Display Format for 
Application to  Transport Aircraft Approach 
and Landing. NASA TM-81199, 1980. 
17. Spady, A.  A. Jr.: Airline Pilot Scan Patterns 
During Simulated ILS Approaches. NASA 
TP-1250, 1978. 
18. Siegel, S.: Nonpara~netric Statistics for the 
Behavioral Sciences. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 
Inc., New York, 1956. 
HEAD-UP TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF PILOTS WITH AND 
Ames Research Center, NASA, Moffett Field, Calif. 94035, and 
*San Jose State University Foundation, San Jose, Calif. 95 192 
Space Administration 
This Head-Up Display (HUD) report is number 10 in a series. 
To quantify head-up transition behavior with and without a flightpath type head-up display, eight rated 
B-727 pilots each flew 31 manual and coupled approaches in a simulator with B-727 dynamics and collimated 
model board external scene. Data were also obtained on the roll played by the head-up display in the coupled- 
to-manual transition. Various wind shears, low visibilities, and ceilings were tested along with unexpected mis- 
alignment between the runway and head-up display symbology. The symbolic format used was a conformal 
flightpath type optically superimposed over the external scene. The following results are reported. (1) Every 
pilot except one stayed head-up, flying with the display after descending below the ceiling. Without the dis- 
play and as altitude decreased, the number of lookups from the instrument panel decreased and the duration 
of each one increased. (2) No large differences in mean number or duration of transitions up or down were 
found during the head-up display runs comparing the no-misalignment with the lateral instrument landing sys- 
tem offset misalignment runs. (3) The head-up display led to fewer transitions after the pilot made a decision 
to land or execute a missed approach. (4) Without the .display, pilots generally waited until they had des- 
cended below the ceiling to look outside the first time, but with it several pilots looked down at their panel at 
relatively high altitudes (if they looked down at all). (5) Manual takeover of control was rapid and smooth 
both with and without the display. The display permitted smoother engine power changes, that is, fewer 
changes of usually smaller magnitude after autopilot disconnect. Vertical rate and control column displace- 
ment data before and after disconnect showed no significant differences. (6) A posttest debriefing indicated 
overall acceptance of the format used and overall test realism. 
Head-up transition behavior 
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NASA-Lanql ey, 1980 

